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Family Law Reader

Family Law Reader

March 2002

Premarital Agreements and ERISA Benefits

Laura W. Morgan

More and more couples are turning to premarital agreements to define their interests in property. Although the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association states there are no definitive figures, an article in the July 1999 issue of Money Magazine stated that in 1990, the incidence of couples using premarital agreements was 1%; in 1999, it was 5%. The article’s author opined that reason for the rise in the use of premarital agreements is that the rate of divorce has risen, and consequently the rate of remarriage has risen as well. Moreover, the median age of first marriage has increased from 22.8 to 27.1 for men, and 20.3 to 24.8 for women. Because older persons tend to be more established financially, they have turned to antenuptial agreements with increasing frequency.

Generally, there is no public policy barring individuals from waiving property rights in an antenuptial agreement. In fact, many a court has stated that antenuptial agreements dealing with property division upon divorce are to be encouraged as a way of promoting marital harmony.

Nonetheless, there are certain rights that some courts have held cannot be waived as a matter of public policy. For example, some courts have held that a spouse cannot waive the right to sue for divorce. Coggins v. Coggins, 601 So. 2d 109 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). Some courts have held that a spouse cannot waive the right to support during the marriage. E.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (1993); Blanton v. Blanton, 654 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. DCA 1995); Solomon v. Solomon, 224 A.D.2d 331, 637 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1996); Dimick v. Dimick, 112 Nev. 56, 915 P.2d 254 (1996); Boyer v. Boyer, 925 P.2d 82 (Okla. Ct. app. 1996). Another right that parties cannot waive, not because of public policy, but because of federal preemption, is the right a spouse has in a private pension governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

As family law practitioners are painfully aware, ERISA contains an anti-assignment clause that prevents pension owners from transferring their pension rights to another person. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). The only way for a domestic relations court to assign pension benefits is by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(A). See Roth v. Roth, 201 Mich. App. 563, 506 N.W.2d 900 (1993) (containing general historical review of state court authority to divide ERISA-regulated retirement benefits). Federal law preemption of state law on ERISA rights is clear. What is not so clear is whether private parties can waive any and all ERISA rights by an antenuptial agreement. The most recent case to discuss the federal preemption issue is Hagwood v. Newton, No. 01-1909 (U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit, February 26, 2002)

First, the law is relatively clear that an antenuptial waiver of survivor benefits under an ERISA-qualified plan is ineffective. The surviving spouse’s entitlement to an annuity cannot be waived unless the spouse consents to the designation of an alternative beneficiary in writing and the consent acknowledges the effect of the waiver and the consent is witnessed by a notary public or plan representative. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(1), (2). No other document will do. Thus, an antenuptial agreement, which is not signed by a spouse, and is generally not witnessed by a notary public or plan representative, is ineffective to waive survivor benefits. National Automotive Dealers v. Arbeitman, 89 F.2d 496 (8th Cir. 1996); Callahan v. Hutsell, Callahan & Buchino, 14 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 1993); Pedro Enterprises v. Perdue, 998 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1993); Howard v. Branham & Baker Coal Co., 968 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1992); Hurwitz v. Sher, 982 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 912, 113 S. Ct. 2345 (1993); Nellis v. Boeing Co., 1992 WL 122773 (D. Kan. 1992); Zinn v. Donaldson Co., 799 F. Supp. 69 (D. Minn. 1992).

In the most recent case to discuss the issue, Hagwood v. Newton, No. 01-1909 (U.S. Court of Appeals, 4th Circuit, February 26, 2002), Toni Odom and Charles Newton signed a “Premarital Agreement,” agreeing that the property of each would remain separate after their marriage and explicitly waiving any right to each other’s property. Two years after Odom and Newton were married, Odom died. Her estate and her father now seek to enforce the Premarital Agreement against Newton’s spousal rights in Odom’s employee stock plan and savings plan, conferred on Newton by § 205(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a). Because the Premarital Agreement did not comport with ERISA’s formal requirements for waiver of Newton’s spousal rights, the court concluded that the agreement cannot be enforced to deny Newton’s spousal rights in Odom’s benefit plans.

The court pointed to previous precedent as well:

In reaching our conclusion that premarital agreements generally cannot fulfill the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c), we join the unanimous view of other federal courts that have considered the question. See, e.g., National Automobile Dealers & Assocs. Retirement Trust v. Arbeitman, 89 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that an agreement “signed before the marriage failed to satisfy the waiver requirements of ERISA”); Hurwitz, 982 F.2d at 782 (holding that premarital agreements “do not constitute effective waivers under ERISA”); Ford Motor Co. v. Ross, 129 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073-74 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that “premarital agreement cannot be used to circumvent ERISA’s spousal waiver requirements”); Zinn v. Donaldson Co., 799 F. Supp. 69, 73 (D. Minn. 1992) (same); Nellis v. Boeing Co., No. 91-1011-K, 1992 WL 122773, *4 (D. Kan. May 8, 1992) (holding that a premarital agreement was not valid waiver because it “was not signed while [the wife] was a spouse with current vested rights in the plans”). But see Estate of Hopkins, 574 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that premarital agreement was valid waiver under 29 U.S.C. § 1055 even though the parties were not yet married).

As noted by the Hagwood court, one decision departs from this rule. In In re Estate of Hopkins, 214 Ill. App. 3d 427, 574 N.E.2d 230 (1991), the husband and wife executed an antenuptial agreement in 1982, whereby the wife waived any and all rights she had in the husband’s ERISA-qualified pension, including survivor rights. The husband then died, and the wife sought her survivor benefits, claiming her waiver was ineffectual because it did not conform to 29 U.S.C. § 1055. The court disagreed, and held that “the specific waiver requirements” of ERISA need not be complied with in order for the waiver to be effective. See also Fox Valley & Vicinity Construction Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding waiver of pension rights in property settlement agreement that did not comply with ERISA’s waiver requirements).

Second, the law is not clear whether the parties can waive, by an antenuptial agreement, other ERISA pension rights. For example, in In re Marriage of Rahn, 914 P.2d 463 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995), the parties executed an antenuptial agreement whereby they agreed that “all of the property now owned or hereafter acquired by husband will remain his sole and separate property throughout the marriage. Wife shall not claim or acquire any interest in any of his property if it increases in value during the marriage, jointly held property being excepted.” The wife contended that the trial court erred when it determined that she waived her spousal rights to her husband’s ERISA-qualified pension plan. The husband contended that the federal statutes and regulations address the waiver of survivor benefits only, and are silent as to other type of pension benefits under an ERISA-qualified plan. Thus, the husband argued, the wife was free to waive her rights in the husband’s pension other than survivor benefits, and the antenuptial agreement was a valid waiver of those rights. The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the waiver of rights other than survivor benefits, reasoning that ERISA provides the explicit requirements for a spouse’s waiver of rights to the “qualified joint and survivor annuity” and the “qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity” in a qualified ERISA plan. Regulations interpreting ERISA’s statutory authority specifically state:

An agreement entered into prior to marriage does not satisfy the applicable requirements, even if the agreement is executed within the applicable election period.

Thus, a waiver of a right to survivor benefits in an ERISA-qualified plan in an antenuptial agreement is ineffective and the surviving spouse is entitled to the survivor benefits even though others are named as survivor beneficiaries with the plan administrator. ERISA does NOT, however, preempt states dissolution of marriage laws with respect to the waiver of other interests in an ERISA-qualified retirement plan, despite the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA. A valid waiver can be enforced through a QDRO.

Other courts have agreed that ERISA’s preemption extends only to survivor benefits and not to other ERISA benefits. Fox Vally & Vicinity Construction Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1990); Moor-Jankowski v. Moor-Jankowski, 222 A.D.2d 422, 634 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1995). Thus, a party is free to waive ERISA benefits other than survivor benefits by an antenuptial agreement.

A New Jersey case, Hawxzhurst v. Hawxzhurst, 318 N.J. Super. 72, 723 A.2d 58 (1998), found that the wife had not waived her rights in her husband’s pension, and this case should be contrasted with Rahm. In Hawxzhurst, the parties signed an antenuptial agreement whereby the wife would be entitled to 50% of the husband’s net worth in the event of a divorce after a marriage of five years or longer. The agreement also provided that each party shall keep and retain sole ownership in property owned at the time of the marriage, and each party waives any rights in that separate property.

The husband argued that his IRA, 50% of which was awarded to the wife under the terms of the antenuptial agreement, was not subject to equitable distribution, because the wife had waived any rights in it. Specifically, the husband’s IRA was traceable to his ERISA-qualified pension at Bell Atlantic. When he retired, he took a lump-sum distribution of his pension and rolled it over into the IRA. It was undisputed that the IRA was totally traceable to the husband’s pension and had not been commingled with marital funds. The court held that the antenuptial agreement simply did not apply to the IRA, although it might have applied had the pension not been rolled over, because the anti-alienation provision of ERISA could not apply to the IRA even if the IRA funds were completely traceable to the pension. “Benefits” are protected by ERISA only while they are within the fiduciary responsibility of the fund manager. Thus, the antenuptial agreement did not operate to waive the wife’s rights in the IRA.

In contrast to Rahm and Hawxzhurst, some courts have held that an antenuptial agreement cannot waive any rights under an ERISA-qualified plan. For example, in Richards v. Richards, 167 Misc. 2d 392, 640 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1995), affirmed 648 N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Div. 1996), the parties executed an antenuptial agreement prior to the marriage. Each party waived rights in the past and future earnings of the other. The wife specifically waived any claim to the husband’s present or future pension, both in equitable distribution and as a survivor. Without distinguishing between survivor rights and other types of rights, the court held that “Federal law precludes giving effect to a prenuptial waiver of spousal rights under ERISA.”

Practice Tip: Parties wishing to waive ERISA-qualified pension rights in an antenuptial agreement would be well-advised to include in the agreement a provision whereby after the marriage, the spouse waiving the pension rights agrees to execute any and all forms required to effect the waiver under 29 U.S.C. § 1055.

Option 1:
After the marriage, each party shall execute any document necessary to effectuate the terms of this agreement. More specifically, each party shall, upon request of the other party and upon being provided with the necessary documents, execute a waiver of rights in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 1055.
Option 2:
It is further agreed and understood between the parties that the written waivers as herein described shall be executed by _____ subsequent to the marriage of the parties, when ______ shall have achieved the status of spouse as required under ERISA for such waivers to be valid and binding. Such waiver shall be executed in conformance with 29 U.S.C. § 1055. Any waiver executed after the marriage in conformance with this paragraph shall be deemed to be substantial compliance with the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1055.


Branco v. UCFW-Northern California Employers Joint Pension Plan, No. 00-15884 (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, February 11, 2002): The court was called upon to decide whether ERISA preempts a state law which allows a predeceased spouse’s interest in her ex-husband’s pension plan to pass to her heirs. The court concluded that based on Egelhoff, ERISA preempts California community property laws.

Ex Parte D.W. and J.C.W., No. 1001467 (Alabama Supreme Court, February 8, 2002): The Mississippi Court of Appeals held that the state’s grandparent visitation statute which provides that a grandparent can obtain visitation with a grandchild who was adopted by a family member if it is in the child’s best interests, § 26-10A-30, was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed. “It was the clear intent of the Legislature in enacting § 26-10A-30 to give the trial court the authority to grant post-adoption visitation rights to the natural grandparents of the adoptee, when the adoptee is adopted by a family member. The only reasonable conclusion is that the Legislature intended to limit the rights of the adopting parents by allowing the possibility of court-ordered grandparent visitation over the objections of the adopting parents. Any other conclusion would fail to give any effect to § 26-10A-30, in violation of this Court’s duty to harmonize the statutory provisions in order to give effect to all parts of the statute. Under the facts of this case, adopting parents, whose rights are exclusively dependent upon statutory law, must be treated differently than natural parents. The Court of Civil Appeals erred in failing to note this distinction and, as a result, erroneously held that Troxel compelled the reversal of the judgment of the trial court.”

Tennille v. Tennille, No. 99-CV-1001 & 00-CV-924 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, February 14, 2002): The ex-husband appealed from the entry of default judgment on a breach of contract action where he agreed to pay his former wife a fixed percent of his income in lieu of alimony. He also appealed the denial of a motion for relief from that judgment after he deliberately ignored the complaint after proper service on him and also ignored discovery requests. The appellate court affirmed, holding that even though he might have had a meritorious defense, his deliberate disregard of the judicial process warranted the default judgment.

Strother v. Strother, No. 27149 (Idaho Court of Appeals, February 8, 2002): The husband sent the wife a check, with the notation that it was in full satisfaction of a court order. After the wife cashed the check, the husband claimed accord and satisfaction of his obligations under the parties’ separation agreement. The court disagreed, and held that his notation of what the check satisfied was not plain and unambiguous.

Terwilliger v. Terwilliger, No. 1999-SC-1064-DG (Kentucky Supreme Court, February 7, 2002): Mr. Terwilliger drafted the parties’ separation agreement, and urged the wife to sign the agreement without consulting independent counsel. In connection with the agreement, the husband represented to the wife that his corporations were nearly bankrupt and bleeding money, and that she needed to sign the agreement as soon as possible to forestall the creditors. Guess what? After she signed the agreement, the husband sold the corporation, and he walked away with over $1.6 million, while she walked away with about $23,350. The wife moved to reopen the divorce based on fraud, and the husband argued that his misrepresentations did not amount to fraud on the court. In reaching its decision that the husband had committed fraud, the Kentucky court discussed the “intrinsic/extrinsic” fraud distinction, and held that the husband’s fraud was of such a nature as to constitute a fraud on the court.

DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, No. SJC-08614 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, February 8, 2002): The trial court held the parties’ prenuptial agreement invalid as being unfair and unreasonable both at the time it was executed and when the husband sought its enforcement on commencing a divorce action nearly eight years after the parties were married. The husband appealed, and the SJC reversed, holding the evidence did not warrant such a conclusion. After some negotiation, including the wife rejecting a number of drafts, the agreement provided that the wife would receive the marital home free of encumbrance, yearly support of $35,000 until her death or remarriage with an annual cost-of-living increase, an automobile, and medical insurance until her death or remarriage. All property jointly acquired during the marriage would be divided between the parties in equal shares.Both attorneys were present when the parties executed the agreement and the signing was recorded on videotape. The recording shows the husband’s attorney reciting the terms of the agreement and the parties communicating their understanding of and consent to those terms. The parties acknowledge they have received advice from counsel of their choice, that they understand their rights in the absence of the agreement, and that they each have read the other’s financial disclosures. The court concluded, “Applying the correct legal standard, we conclude that the judge’s findings do not support a conclusion that the agreement was not fair and reasonable when it was executed. Substantively, the agreement provided that in the event of divorce the husband would continue to provide for the wife’s support and her health insurance until her death or remarriage; she would also have housing (the marital home) and transportation. These provisions do not strip the wife of her marital rights. In fact, they leave her in a better economic position than she had before the marriage.”

Roof Depot, Inc. v. Ohman, No. C5-01-1112 (Minnesota Court of Appeals, February 6, 2002): A provision in a marriage-dissolution decree purporting to grant a lien on stock in a closely held corporation does not supersede restrictions on pledging or encumbering that stock when a proper notice appears on the stock certificate and the underlying transfer-restriction agreement applies to pledges and encumbrances whether voluntary or involuntary and whether by operation of law or otherwise.

In re Estate of Hodges, No. 2001-CA-00030-SCT (Mississippi Supreme Court, February 14, 2002): The parties’ separation agreement provided that the husband would pay the wife the sum of $4,000.00 per month in periodic alimony. The agreement also made provision for the maintenance of life insurance by both parties. With regard to the life insurance, the agreement provided the following: “Husband shall maintain his current policy of life insurance with Wife listed as a name beneficiary thereon for a sum not more than $164,000.00. Provided however, Wife’s interest in the life insurance policy shall decrease at the rate of $4,000.00 per month beginning July 1, 1997, and a like amount each month thereafter so long as alimony is paid by Husband.” The husband then died intestate. At the time of his death, he had timely made alimony payments to the wife totaling $92,000.00. The wife then presented herself to AMA Provident Life Insurance Company as the beneficiary of all $200,000.00 of the husband’s life insurance proceeds, and she proceeded to retain the entire amount. Counsel for the Estate made several requests for the Estate’s share of the life insurance proceeds under the terms of the agreement. The wife, however, refused to transmit the requested sum of $128,000.00 to the Estate. The appellate court held, “In reading the agreement as a whole and considering the intention of the parties, we find that Joan and Jeff clearly contracted for $164,000.00 of the life insurance proceeds to be maintained to guarantee a limited amount of alimony to be paid to Joan in the event of Jeff’s death. The amount was to be reduced by each subsequent alimony payment made by Jeff. The instrument undisputably manifested the parties’ intention to provide a minimum amount of alimony payments to Joan and established a death provision which was tied to the alimony obligation. Joan clearly agreed to these terms. The chancellor erred in allowing Joan to received a windfall. To find otherwise circumvents the express language of the agreement. The chancellor was correct in the determination that the insurance policy was a separate contract, but the lower court inadvertently overlooked the fact that Joan, as a party to the agreement, contracted away her claim to receive more than the remaining $72,000.00 owed to her under the terms of the agreement.”

Day v. Heller, 10 Neb. App. 886 (Nebraska Court of Appeals, February 12, 2002): Robert E. Day, Jr., appealed from an order of the district court for Sarpy County granting summary judgment in favor of Robin E. Heller and dismissing Robert’s petition. In Robert’s action against Robin, he sought damages in tort for fraud, assumpsit, and emotional distress upon discovering that he is not the biological father of Adam, who was born during Robin and Robert’s marriage. The district court granted summary judgment on the basis that Robin was entitled to a judgment on the merits and on a finding of paternity in Robert and Robin’s earlier dissolution proceeding which acted as res judicata and barred Robert’s current causes of action. The court of appeals found that Robert’s causes of action in tort were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and found that summary judgment was improper.

Jeffries v. Moore, No. COA00-1292 (North Carolina Court of Appeals, February 5, 2002): A third party sought to establish the paternity of a child born to a woman in an intact marriage. The court held that Johnson v. Johnson, 120 N.C. App. 1, 461 S.E.2d 369 (1995), rev’d by, 343 N.C. 114, 468 S.E.2d 59 (1996) (per curiam) does not prohibit an alleged parent from challenging the presumption of legitimacy which attaches when a child is born during a marriage union.

In re Marriage of Medill, No. A112620 (Oregon Court of Appeals, February 20, 2002): Father and mother met and married in Denmark while father was serving in the military in Germany. The parties had two children. Father the moved to Oregon, while mother and children stayed in Germany. The parties agreed that father would file for divorce in Oregon. The 1998 dissolution judgment included parenting time and joint custody provisions. Father then went back to court for modification and contempt. In 1999, mother initiated custody proceedings in Germany. The Oregon court dismissed father’s modification action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

Diamond v. Diamond, No. 2002 PA Super 34 (Pennsylvania Superior Court, February 13, 2002): An attorney representing the wife in a divorce case lost the husband’s financial records produced in discovery. She was then held in contempt for failing to comply with an order to pay the bank for copies of the lost originals. The attorney appealed. The appellate court held that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the attorney in contempt and ordering her to pay the husband’s costs of seeking compliance with order.

Mays v. Mays, No. W2000-03067-COA-R3-CV (Tennessee Court of Appeals, February 5, 2002): The husband appealed the property division, denial of rehabilitative alimony, award of attorney’s fees to wife, and decision not to hear evidence on child custody. The court held that when the husband deposited inherited funds into a marital bank account and then used the bank account for marital purposes, the separate funds transmuted into marital property. The husband also argued that he suffered from depression, which limited his earning capacity, and he was thus entitled to rehabilitative alimony. The court found the husband able to work, and thus without need of rehabilitative alimony. (Interestingly, the husband also claimed he should have been awarded custody, because although he suffered from depression and couldn’t work, he was able to care for the children.)


Family Law Journals and Symposia of Interest

Brigham Young University Law Review, Volume 2001, Number 3

“Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution”

Francis J. Catania, Jr., Learning from the Process of Decision: The Parenting Plan, page 857

Craig W. Dallon, The Likely Impact of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution on Property Division, page 891

James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family: The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, page 923

William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review and Critique, page 961

F. Carolyn Graglia, A Nonfeminist’s Perspectives of Mothers and Homemakers Under Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, page 993

Lino A. Graglia, Single-Sex “Marriage”: The Role of the Courts, page 1013

Terry S. Kogan, Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus Opposite-Sex, Unmarried Couples in Domestic Partnership Laws and Ordinances, page 1023

Gregory A. Loken, The New “Extended Family” — “De Facto” Parenthood and Standing Under Chapter 2, page 1045

David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, page 1075

Janet Leach Richards, Resolving Relocation Issues Pursuant to the ALI Family Dissolution Principles: Are Children Better Protected?, page 1105

Mark Strasser, A Small Step Forward: The ALI Domestic Partners Recommendation, page 1135

David M. Wagner, Balancing “Parents Are” and “Parents Do” in the Supreme Court’s Constitutionalized Family Law: Some Implications for the ALI Proposals on De Facto Parenthood, page 1175

Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s “Domestic Partners” Proposal, page 1189

Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some Conflict-of-Laws Questions and Concerns, page 1235

Articles (alphabetical by author)

Marianne Brower Blair, The Impact of Family Paradigms, Domestic Constitutions, and International Conventions on Disclosure of an Adopted Person’s Identities and Heritage: A Comparative Examination, 4 Michigan Journal of International Law 587 (2001)

Pamela Gatos, Third Parent Adoption in Lesbian and Gay Families, 26 Vermont Law Review 195 (2001)

Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 Georgetown Law Journal 299 (2002)

Steven R. Hellman, Stepparent Custody upon the Death of the Custodial Parent, 14 Journal of the Suffolk Academy of Law 23 (2000)

Tori R. A. Kricken, Child Support and Social Security Dependent Benefits: A Comprehensive Analysis and Proposal for Wyoming, 2 Wyoming Law Review 39 (2002)

Judith G. McMullen, The Professional Athlete: Issues in Child Support, 12 Marquette Sports Law Journal 411 (2001)

Joan Shufro, Should These Marriages Have Been Saved?: Extreme Cruelty as a Cause of Action for Divorce in New Jersey 1950 — 1970, 23 Women's Rights Law Reporter 79 (2001)

And to answer the question why you should care about these articles at all:

Thomas L. Fowler, Law Reviews and Their Relevance to Modern Legal Problems, 24 Campbell Law Review 47 (2001)

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